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JNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  BULLETIN 

Issued  Weekly 


ol.  XVI 


December  30,  1918 


No.  18 


ntered  as  second-class  matter  December  11,  1912,  at  the  post  office  at  Urbana,  Illinois,  under  the  Act  of  August 
24,  1912.  Acceptance  for  mailing  at  the  special  rate  of  postage  provided  for  in  section  1103,  Act  of  October  3. 
1917,  authorized  July  31,  1918.] 


Terrk^M  Problems  of  the 

f 

Baltic  Basin 

BY 

LAURENCE  Mf"  LARSON 

Professor  of  History 


PRICE  TEN  CENTS 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  WAR  COMMITTEE 
OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
URBANA 


TERRITORIAL  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  BALTIC  BASIN. 


In  these  days  we  often  think  of  seas,  rivers,  and  other  waterways  as 
natural  boundaries  separating  nations  and  peoples,  and  affording  a 
certain  security  against  attack  and  invasion.  But  in  earlier  centuries, 
in  the  age  before  strategic  railways,  this  was  not  the  prevailing  belief. 
Three  generations  ago  the  seas  were  not  regarded  as  barriers:  they  were 
connecting  influences  that  served  to  bind  states  and  regions  together. 
The  sea  has  always  been  important  as  the  great  highway  of  commerce, 
and  it  has  also  facilitated  the  exchange  of  beliefs  and  ideas.  In  the 
past,  nations  have  therefore  been  peculiarly  interested  in  the  seas  that 
washed  their  shores,  and  also  in  the  other  shores  that  were  touched  by 
the  same  waters. 

In  spite  of  changed  conditions  of  travel  and  transport,  the  interest 
in  waterways  has  persisted.  Italy  seems  anxious  to  control  both 
shores  of  the  Adriatic;  and  England  feels  that  she  must  control  the 
entire  circuit  of  the  Irish  Sea.  No  nation  at  present  can  hope  to  make 
the  Baltic  Sea  its  own;  but  such  ambitions  have  been  cherished  in  the 
past  and  at  times  almost  realized.  Four  hundred  years  ago  Denmark 
was  the  greatest  power  on  the  “Eastern  Sea.”  In  the  seventeenth 
century  Sweden  developed  an  even  more  complete  hegemony  in  those 
waters,  but  was  forced  to  surrender  it  to  the  Russians  early  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  In  recent  years  Germany  has  dominated  the 
Baltic,  and  for  a year  after  the  Russian  collapse  the  shores  and  the  ship- 
ping of  the  entire  sea  was  at  her  mercy. 

It  should  be  noted  that  Sweden  has  all  her  sea  coast  on  these  inland 
waters,  that  Denmark  and  Prussia  have  a number  of  important  ports 
on  the  Baltic,  and  that  in  1914  Russia,  too,  had  a long  “window”  look- 
ing out  upon  this  same  sea.  Economically  speaking,  the  Baltic  region 
is  to  a great  extent  a unit.  In  the  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
Great  War  the  exports  of  Russia  were  directed  chiefly  toward  Germany, 
from  which  country  she  also  drew  more  than  half  of  her  imports.  The 
commerce  of  Sweden  has  always  traveled  chiefly  eastward  and  south- 
ward, to  Russia  and  to  Germany.  It  is  therefore  quite  natural  that 
the  peoples  occupying  the  shores  of  this  great  waterway  should  be 
interested  in  every  important  change  that  appears  in  any  other  part  of 
the  basin. 

There  was  great  anxiety  in  Sweden  when  the  Tsar  began  to  mobil- 
ize, and  the  Danes  trembled  when  the  Kaiser  drew  the  sword  But 
now  there  is  chaos  in  Russia  and  turmoil  in  Germany.  And  out  of 


2 


9V7.  V 


■ 


/ 


the  confusion  that  prevails  along  the  eastern  and  southern  shores  of 
the  Baltic  basin  have  arisen  a series  of  intricate  territorial  problems, 
some  of  which  appear  to  be  almost  incapable  of  satisfactory  solutions. 

North  Sleswick 

English  and  American  writers  have  recently  referred  to  a problem 
of  Sleswick-Holstein,  to  a Danish  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  restoration  of 
which  is  said  to  be  stoutly  demanded  in  Denmark.  It  happens,  however, 
that  there  is  no  problem  of  Sleswick-Holstein,  and  the  Danish  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  a much  smaller  area  than  is  usually  described  by  those  who 
write  on  territorial  peace  problems.  For  a period  of  four  hundred  years 
the  kings  of  Denmark  were  also  counts  or  dukes  of  Holstein;  but  Hol- 
stein was  never  Danish  either  in  race,  language,  or  sentiment,  and  was 
never  a part  of  the  kingdom  of  Denmark. 

Sleswick,  on  the  other  hand,  at  one  time  actually  did  belong  to 
Denmark  and  it  is  a question  whether  it  was  not  still  a part  of  the 
kingdom,  when  the  German  powers  seized  the  two  duchies,  Sleswick  and 
Holstein,  in  1864.  There  are  Danes  at  present  who  wish  to  claim  the 
greater  part  or  even  the  whole  of  Sleswick  on  historic  grounds,  but  this 
desire  is  not  general.  With  the  passing  of%time  the  southern  part  of 
the  old  duchy  has  become  German  in  speech  and  sentiment,  and  the 
Danish  people  do  not  care  to  annex  or  even  to  reannex  territory  the 
population  of  which  is  of  an  alien  nationality. 

The  case  of  North  Sleswick  is  wholly  different;  this  region  has  been 
Danish  and  Danish  only  for  more  than  a thousand  years.  The  same  is 
true  of  parts  of  Mid  Sleswick  where  both  the  German  and  the  Danish 
nationality  are  strongly  represented.  The  Danes  were  glad  in  1864  to 
sever  the  old  connection  with  Holstein;  they  yielded  South  Sleswick 
with  great  reluctance;  but  the  separation  from  North  Sleswick  has  ever 
since  been  a source  of  national  grief. 

The  fact  that  Sleswick  was  not  all  German  was  recognized  in  the 
treaty  of  Prague  (August  23,  1866),  by  which  the  emperor  of  Austria, 
yielded  his  rights  in  the  conquered  duchies  to  the  king  of  Prussia.  This 
treaty  stipulated  that  the  inhabitants  of  “the  northern  districts  of 
Sleswick”  should  be  allowed  to  decide  by  referendum  whether  their 
country  should  continue  a part  of  Prussia  or  be  returned  to  Denmark. 
No  such  referendum  has  ever  been  allowed.  In  1878  Austria  released 
Prussia  from  this  obligation;  but  the  Danes  of  Sleswick  insist  that  the 
pledge  is  still  a binding  one  and  that  the  right  of  decision  belongs  to 
them. 


3 


The  problem  of  North  Sleswick  is,  therefore,  not  whether  a certain 
territory  shall  be  restored  to  Denmark,  but  whether  the  inhabitants  of 
that  region  shall  be  allowed  to  exercise  the  right  of  self-determination 
which  was  promised  them  more  than  fifty  years  ago. 

Time  and  again  the  Danish  members  in  the  Reichstag  have  risen  to 
demand  a referendum  with  refusal  as  the  invariable  result.  During 
the  present  war  German  opinion  seems  to  have  become  more  favorable 
to  the  cause  of  the  inhabitants  of  North  Sleswick,  who  for  more  than 
half  a century  have  fought  to  maintain  their  nationality;  but  the  policy 
of  the  government  has  been  more  repressive  than  ever  before:  it  was  a 
criminal  act  even  to  mention  the  Sleswick  question  in  the  public  press. 
To  discuss  the  matter  at  a public  meeting  was  also  forbidden. 

But  early  in  Octo'ber,  1918,  the  citizens  of  North  Sleswick  were  in- 
formed by  their  representative  in  Berlin  that  the  Prussian  regime  was 
doomed  and  that  the  throne  itself  was  tottering.  A week  later  certain 
important  steps  were  taken  preparatory  to  another  demand  for  a ref- 
erendum. When  the  German  government  announced  that  it  was 
willing  to  accept  President  Wilson’s  peace  program,  the  Sleswick  Danes 
felt  that  their  day  had  arrived,  and  on  October  23  the  question  of  their 
future  status  was  brought  up  in  the  Reichstag.  The  secretary  for 
foreign  affairs,  Dr.  Solf,  denied  vigorously  that  Denmark  had  any  claim 
on  any  part  of  the  old  duchy,  but  privately  he  informed  the  Sleswick 
Danes  that  the  government  was  disposed  to  grant  their  request. 

A few  days  after  the  armistice  had  become  a fact  and  Germany  was 
still  in  the  throes  of  the  revolution,  the  Sleswick  Danes  took  action  to 
bring  their  case  before  the  peace  conference.  The  Electoral  Union, 
the  political  organ  of  the  Danish  part  of  the  population,  at  a meeting 
in  Aabenraa  (November  16)  adopted  a series  of  resolutions  in  which  a 
referendum  was  demanded  and  certain  conditions  laid  down  of  which 
the  following  are  the  most  important: 

(1)  The  southern  boundary  of  North  Sleswick  is  defined  as  a line 
beginning  at  a point  a few  miles  north  of  Flensborg  and  drawn  in  a 
general  westerly  and  slightly  northwesterly  direction  across  the  penin- 
sula. It  is  desired  that  the  area  north  of  this  boundary  shall  vote  as  a 
unit. 

(2)  It  is  also  demanded  that  such  adjacent  districts  in  Mid  Sleswick 
as  may  wish  to  vote  on  the  question  of  reannexation  to  Denmark  shall 
be  permitted  to  do  so. 

(3)  All  men  and  women  of  the  age  of  twenty  or  above  who  are 
residents  of  the  districts  concerned  (except  Germans  who  have  lived 

4 


less  than  ten  years  in  the  country)  shall  be  allowed  to  participate  in 
the  referendum.  Former  residents  who  have  been  exiled  by  the  Prus- 
sian authorities  shall  also  be  allowed  to  vote. 

The  Danish  government  has  been  requested  to  present  the  case  of 
North  Sleswick  to  the  Allied  powers  and  has  consented  to  do  so.  It 
seems  extremely  probable  that  the  peace  conference  will  take  favorable 
action.  That  North  Sleswick  will  cast  an  overwhelming  vote  for  reun- 
ion with  Denmark  is  beyond  question.  The  referendum,  if  held,  will 
add  at  least  150,000  persons  to  the  Danish  population;  if  Mid  Sleswick 
is  also  allowed  to  participate,  the  number  may  exceed  200,000.  It  was 
argued  at  the  Aabenraa  conference  that  the  present  anarchic  conditions 
in  Germany  are  likely  to  influence  the  voters  of  Mid  Sleswick  very 
strongly  in  the  direction  of  a choice  of  allegiance  to  Denmark.  But 
the  conference  was  also  agreed  that  “we  must  not  demand  more  than 
what  is  really  ours.” 

The  Kiel  Canal 

It  has  been  urged  by  certain  influential  English  editors  and  states- 
men that  not  only  the  Danish-speaking  part  of  Sleswick  but  the  entire 
province  of  Sleswick-Holstein  should  be  transferred  to  Denmark.  The 
origin  of  this  suggestion  lies  in  an  effort  to  find  a satisfactory  solution 
for  the  problem  of  the  Kiel  Canal.  For  there  seems  to  be  a strong 
feeling  in  certain  quarters  that  Germany  must  be  deprived  of  the  con- 
trol of  this  waterway. 

The  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  (usually  called  the  Kiel  Canal)  begins 
at  Brunsbiittel  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  River  and  terminates  at  Halte- 
nau  on  the  Baltic  Sea,  two  or  three  miles  north  of  Kiel.  Brunsbiittel 
is  in  Holstein,  while  Haltenau  is  just  within  the  boundary  of  Sleswick. 
For  a distance  of  twenty  miles  or  more  (between  Rendsborg  and  Halte- 
nau) the  canal  runs  very  close  to  or  along  the  border  separating  the  two 
old  duchies;  for  a short  distance  it  cuts  through  what  has  always  been 
Sleswick  territory. 

The  annexation  of  the  entire  province  would  consequently  place  the 
Danes  in  possession  of  the  entire  canal.  The  annexation  of  Sleswick 
alone  might,  perhaps,  be  sufficient,  as  it  would  make  the  canal  an  inter- 
national waterway.  Such  an  arrangement  would  leave  the  Germans  in 
possession  of  the  greater  part  of  it,  but  the  Danes  would  control  the 
Baltic  terminal,  and  they  would  also  share  to  some  extent  in  the  control 
of  the  traffic  on  the  canal  because  of  its  character  as  a waterway  on  the 
boundary.  Shortly  after  the  armistice  had  been  proclaimed  a writer 

5 


in  the  London  Times  suggested  that  the  real  problem  in  Sleswick  is  not 
North  but  South  Sleswick.  Though  he  realized  that  objections  would 
be  raised  to  the  plan,  he  argued  that  the  necessities  of  the  situation  de- 
mand that  Denmark  should  assert  her  right  to  all  of  ancient  Sleswick. 
South  Sleswick  might  be  given  a large  measure  of  political  and  cultural 
autonomy,  but  it  should  become  an  integral  part  of  the  Danish  king- 
dom. The  writer  added  that  the  annexation  of  the  whole  of  Sleswick 
would  give  Denmark  a strategic  boundary,  of  which  that  country 
seems  to  be  in  real  need. 

There  are,  however,  several  excellent  reasons  why  such  a transfer  of 
territory  should  not  be  made,  any  one  of  which  should  be  sufficient  to 
defeat  the  project. 

(1)  It  violates  the  principle  of  nationalism:  what  is  Danish  should 
be  Danish;  what  is  German  must  be  permitted  to  remain  German.  A 
lasting  peace  cannot  be  built  on  the  disregard  of  this  principle.  If 
South  Sleswick  should  declare  her  willingness  to  renew  the  old  allegiance, 
that  would  be  another  matter;  but  such  a decision  is  quite  unlikely. 

(2)  The  Danes  do  not  desire  to  renew  the  old  relationship  with 
Holstein.  From  its  very  beginning  this  connection  was  a source  of 
trouble  and  even  of  danger.  The  revolt  of  1848  and  the  calamities  of 
1864  can  be  traced  directly  to  the  plottings  of  the  intellectuals  and  the 
junkers  of  Holstein  and  German  Sleswick.  But  complete  annexation, 
such  as  is  suggested  at  present,  would  be  far  more  dangerous  to  Denmark 
than  was  the  old  personal  union,  for  it  would  mean  the  addition  of  a 
German  element  numbering  nearly  1,500,000  to  a Danish  population 
counting  a little  more  than  2,700,000.  It  is  quite  clear  that  Denmark 
could  not  accept  a gift  of  this  sort  without  endangering  the  peace  of 
the  kingdom  and  the  future  of  the  Danish  nationality. 

(3)  The  Danes  have  scarcely  sufficient  military  strength  to  be 
entrusted  with  the  guardianship  of  so  important  a waterway  as  the 
Kiel  Canal.  It  has  been  argued  that  in  time  of  war  it  could  easily  be  de- 
stroyed, if  the  Danes  should  find  themselves  unable  to  hold  it.  The 
Kiel  Canal  was,  indeed,  built  for  military  purposes  chiefly;  but  it  is  also 
of  great  commercial  value,  and  it  is  to  the  interest  of  the  world  that  it 
be  kept  intact.  In  the  past  it  has  been  used  mainly  by  German  ships, 
but  it  has  also  been  utilized  to  some  extent  by  those  of  other  nations. 

(4)  It  is  not  possible  to  find  a strategic  boundary  for  Denmark 
that  would  be  of  any  particular  value.  Perhaps  the  most  satisfactory 
would  be  the  old  “Danework”  line  between  the  Sley  inlet  and  the 
Trene  River;  but  this  would  leave  the  Kiel  Canal  wholly  within  German 

6 


territory.  It  should  be  noted  that  Denmark  is  broken  up  into  frag- 
ments, all  of  which  can  be  readily  isolated.  Real  strategic  boundaries 
are  therefore  impossible  in  this  case. 

If  the  Kiel  Canal  is  to  be  taken  away  from  the  Germans,  some  form 
of  international  control  will  have  to  be  devised.  This  is  by  no  means 
an  ideal  arrangement,  but  it  seems  likely  that  the  peace  conference  will 
find  many  other  problems,  especially  where  waterways  are  in  question, 
that  will  admit  of  no  other  solution. 

Finland 

By  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  (signed  March  3,  1918)  the  Bolshevik 
government  formally  surrendered  a broad  strip  of  territory  lying  along 
the  western  frontier  of  the  Russian  empire  from  the  Arctic  regions  to 
the  Sea  of  Azov.  In  parts  of  this  great  area  nationalistic  movements 
had  been  in  active  progress  for  some  months  or  years;  in  others  the 
demand  for  separation  from  Russia  appears  to  have  been  artificially 
created  to  promote  the  plans  of  the  Pan-Germanists. 

When  the  armistice  was  agreed  upon  last  November,  one  of  the 
conditions  laid  down  by  the  Allies  was  that  the  German  government 
should  repudiate  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk.  Technically,  therefore, 
Russia  may  be  said  to  have  recovered  her  territorial  rights  in  the  west 
and  southwest,  except  in  the  case  of  Finland,  the  independence  of 
which  was  recognized  by  the  Bolsheviki  at  Brest-Litovsk  early  in  March, 
1918.  But  the  facts  and  conditions  are  not  what  they  were  in  the  earlier 
months  of  1918;  governments  have  been  set  up  in  the  various  units 
surrendered  at  Brest-Litovsk,  five  or  six  in  all;  and  some  of  these  are 
likely  to  receive  recognition  at  the  peace  conference. 

Among  those  that  will  probably  survive  is  the  new  state  of  Finland. 
From  1808  to  1917  the  Finns  were  counted  among  the  subjects  of  the 
Russian  Tsar.  Constitutionally  Finland  was  an  independent  grand 
duchy  united  with  Russia  in  the  person  of  the  emperor;  practically  this 
meant  merely  that  the  grand  duchy  occupied  a privileged  position 
amon£  the  many  dominions  of  the  Tsar.  During  the  last  twenty-five 
years  of  the  union  the  Russians  were  actively  seeking  to  obliterate  all 
traces  on  Finnish  independence  and  to  “Russify”  the  country.  This 
led  to  determined  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Finns,  and  when  the 
Great  War  broke  out  the  young  men  of  Finland  left  their  homes  in  large 
numbers,  stole  across  the  Baltic  to  Sweden,  and  ultimately  found  their 
way  into  the  German  army. 

When  tsardom  collapsed,  early  in  1917,  the  Finns  seized  the  opportu- 
nity to  assert  their  independence.  They  contended  that  the  union 

7 


with  Russia  was  wholly  personal  and  that  when  the  imperial  office  was 
abolished,  all  connection  with  the  Russian  government  automatically 
terminated.  After  a period  of  civil  war  between  the  Bolshevik  elements 
and  the  more  conservative  classes,  the  middle  class  groups  with  the 
assistance  of  German  forces  were  able  to  organize  a government  of  the 
conservative  type  and  with  leanings  toward  Germany.  A monarchical 
form  of  government  was  agreed  upon  and  the  crown  was  offered  to  a 
Hessian  prince,  a brother-in-law  of  the  Kaiser.  Then  came  the  German 
collapse  with  serious  results  for  the  plans  of  the  Finnish  monarchists. 
A change  in  government  became  inevitable  and  the  country  is  at  present 
administered  by  a senate  counting  seven  monarchists  and  six  republi- 
cans. It  is  significant  that  the  new  regent,  General  Mannerheim,  tele- 
graphed his  acceptance  of  the  office  from  London. 

Thus  far  the  French  government  alone  of  the  Allies  has  recognized 
the  new  state.  A vigorous  propaganda  has  been  carried  on  to  prevent 
further  recognition  and  to  induce  France  to  rescind  her  action;  but  this 
is  not  likely  to  be  successful.  The  probabilities  favor  the  general  recog- 
nition of  an  independent  Finland  at  a reasonably  early  date. 

The  Finnish  problem  at  the  peace  conference  is  chiefly  one  of  bound- 
aries. Finland  as  a political  unit  is  a product  of  Swedish  imperialism. 
The  Swedes  began  their  career  of  conquest  east  of  the  Baltic  in  the 
twelfth  century,  and  they  held  the  grand  duchy  continually  to  the 
earlier  years  of  the  nineteenth  century.  But  they  never  came  into 
control  of  all  the  regions  inhabited  by  Finns:  east  of  their  borders  lived 
a considerable  number  of  that  race  (Karelians)  who  had  accepted 
Russian  rule  and  civilization  and  were  adherents  of  the  Greek  Orthodox 
church. 

During  the  past  year  the  government  at  Helsingfors  has  asked 
that  all  eastern  Karelia  be  transferred  to  Finland,  and  that  the  limits  of 
that  country  be  extended  eastward  to  Lake  Onega  and  northward  to 
the  Arctic  Ocean.  This  suggestion  naturally  found  no  favor  at  Moscow. 
The  Bolsheviki,  in  whom  the  passions  of  national  feeling  and  patriotism 
are  not  strong,  might  conceivably  be  induced  to  surrender  the  territories 
between  Finland  and  the  great  lakes;  but  the  great  peninsula  north  of 
the  White  Sea  they  will  scarcely  be  willing  to  yield.  The  Murman 
(Norman)  coast  and  Kola  peninsula  are  almost  without  economic  value 
and  resources;  they  comprise  a vast  frozen  area  almost  uninhabited 
except  for  a few  nomadic  Lapps  and  roving  Karelians.  But  the  Mur- 
man coast  has  an  ice-free  harbor,  and  Russia  has  lost  more  ports  than 
she  can  afford  to  lose. 


8 


About  sixty  miles  east  of  the  Norwegian  frontier  on  Kola  Bay  lies 
Alexandrowsk  (Catherine  Harbor)  where  ships  may  enter  and  leave  at 
almost  any  time  of  the  year.  In  1915  the  serious  military  situation  (the 
Baltic  and  the  Black  Sea  were  both  closed  by  the  enemy)  forced  Russia 
to  carry  out  an  old  plan  which  called  for  a railway  from  Petrograd  to 
Catherine  Harbor.  If  the  claims  of  the  Finnish  state  are  allowed,  Rus- 
sia will  lose  Catherine  Harbor  and  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  of 
the  Murman  railway.  She  will  have  but  one  remaining  port  on  the 
Arctic:  Archangel,  which  is  ice-bound  nine  months  of  the  year. 

The  conflict  between  Helsingfors  and  Moscow  thus  involves  two 
separate  problems:  eastern  Karelia  and  the  Murman  coast.  The  Kare- 
lians outside  Finland  number  about  350,000;  most  of  them  live  between 
the  Finnish  boundary  and  the  Murman  railway.  In  this  case  the 
principle  of  nationalism  may  perhaps  come  into  collision  with  the 
principle  of  self-determination.  Being  of  the  same  racial  stock  as  the 
western  Karelians,  they  ought,  it  would  seem,  to  take  gladly  to  the 
suggestion  that  their  country  be  joined  to  Finland.  But  if  they  are 
allowed  to  decide  by  referendum  it  is  not  at  all  sure  that  they  will  vote 
to  separate  from  Russia.  The  civilization  of  Finland  is  Swedish  and 
the  religion  is  of  the  Lutheran  type;  while  in  eastern  Karelia  the  faith 
and  the  civilization  of  Russia  have  ruled  the  minds  for  at  least  six  cen- 
turies. 

The  problem  of  the  Murman  coast  is  essentially  economic.  It 
means  that  the  Finns  are  determined  to  secure  an  outlet  on  the  Arctic,, 
which  they  have  never  had.  As  long  as  Finland  promised  to  remain 
under  German  influence,  the  neighboring  states  of  Norway  and  Sweden 
were  reluctant  to  see  Finland  extend  her  territories  to  the  frozen  sea; 
but  as  the  situation  is  at  present  they  are  not  likely  to  interpose  any~ 
objections,  provided  that  their  own  territories  be  left  intact. 

The  Aland  Islands 

Finland  has  long  been  a land  of  strife.  Recently  it  was  the  bour- 
goisie  against  the  Bolsheviki;  earlier  it  was  the  Finn  contending  against 
the  Russian;  still  earlier  it  was  Turanian  Finn  against  Swedish  Fin- 
lander. The  Swedish  element  in  Finland  is  not  great  numerically: 
about  400,000  in  a population  of  about  3,250,000.  But  it  controls  to  a 
large  extent  the  wealth  of  the  country;  in  earlier  days  the  Swedes  were 
the  ruling  class,  and  even  at  the  present  day  their  political  influence  is. 
far  out  of  proportion  to  their  numbers. 

9 


The  Swedes  probably  entered  Finland  by  way  of  the  Aland  archi- 
pelago. The  Alands  are  a group  of  rocks  and  small  islands  lying  across 
the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  Bothnia;  only  one  (Aland)  is  of  any  appre- 
ciable size.  They  approach  to  within  twenty  miles  of  the  Swedish  coast 
and  form  a natural  series  of  stepping  stones  to  the  FinnisTi  mainland. 
Geographically  they  may  be  regarded  as  fragments  of  the  Finnish  land 
mass;  but  they  have  been  inhabited  by  Swedes  as  long  as  their  history 
can  be  traced.  There  is  at  present  a strong,  almost  unanimous  senti- 
ment on  the  islands  in  favor  of  a reunion  with  Sweden. 

The  material  value  of  the  Aland  Islands  is  very  slight.  The  inhabi- 
tants (about  15,000  in  number)  are  chiefly  farmers,  sailors,  and  fisher- 
folk,  subsisting  on  what  they  can  wrest  from  a thin  soil  or  gather  from 
the  waters  about  them.  The  importance  of  the  islands  in  European 
diplomacy  is  due  to  their  strategic  position  with  reference  to  the  capi- 
tals of  Sweden,  Finland,  and  Russia.  The  harbor  facilities  are  good 
and  the  islands  possess  real  possibilities  as  a military  stronghold.  The 
Russians  soon  came  to  see  the  advantage  of  a naval  station  at  Aland  and 
erected  fortifications  at  Bomarsund,  which  were  destroyed  by  the  Eng- 
lish and  the  French  in  the  Crimean  War.  On  the  request  of  Sweden, 
Russia  agreed  not  to  rebuild  the  fortifications,  and  Aland  remained 
unfortified  until  some  time  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War. 

As  Stockholm  is  only  seventy-five  miles  distant,  any  plan  to  build  a 
naval  establishment  on  the  Alands  is  sure  to  produce  uneasiness  in 
Sweden.  For  similar  reasons  Finland  and  Russia  are  anxious  that  the 
archipelago  shall  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Swedes.  Soon  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  Finnish  revolution  a Swedish  force  landed  on  the 
islands  ostensibly  to  maintain  order;  but  they  were  sdon  displaced  by 
German  garrisons.  At  Brest-Litovsk  it  was  agreed  that  the  islands 
should  belong  to  Finland,  but  also  that  they  should  never  be  fortified 
and  that  the  shipping  conditions  in  the  waters  about  them  should  be 
regulated  by  a special  agreement  among  the  nations  most  interested: 
Germany,  Sweden,  Finland,  and  Russia. 

. The  efforts  of  Sweden  to  gain  control  of  the  archipelago  and  the  evi- 
dent desire  of  the  inhabitants  to  be  reunited  with  the  mother  country 
has  caused  much  uneasiness  and  resentment  among  the  Finns.  The 
feeling  that  the  Alands  must  remain  a part  of  Finland  is  shared  by  the 
Swedish  Finlanders  as  well  as  by  the  Turanian  Finns.  The  former 
have  organized  a separate  political  party  the  object  of  which  is  to  secure 
Swedish  nationalism  in  Finland  and  they  call  loudly  to  their  brethren 

10 


'on  the  islands  not  to  desert  them  but  to  remain  with  them  and  help 
them  in  the  struggle  that  is  sure  to  come. 

The  program  recently  published  by  the  Swedish  party  in  Finland 
does  not  promise  a wholly  peaceful  development  in  the  new  state.  It 
calls  for  equal  rights  for  the  two  languages,  Swedish  and  Finnish,  and 
for  equal  opportunities  for  each  in  the  schools  of  the  land.  It  also 
calls  for  the  creation  of  new  administrative  areas  in  order  that  the 
regions  occupied  by  Swedish  Finlanders  may  be  formed  into  compact 
’territorial  units.  For  these  units  an  extensive  autonomy  is  demanded 
and  it  is  also  suggested  that  the  Swedish  churches  should  be  grouped 
into  a separate  diocese.  The  Swedes  also  demand  what  virtually 
amounts  to  a distinct  organization  for  their  part  of  the  army  and  the 
navy.  But  these  demands  (some  of  them,  at  least)  are  sure  to  meet 
^strenuous  opposition  from  the  Turanian  Finns. 

The  problem  of  the  Aland  Islands,  though  in  large  part  a military 
consideration,  is  involved  in  the  nationalistic  conflict  between  Swedes 
and  Finns.  The  Swedish  Finlanders  cannot  afford  to  weaken  their 
^strength  by  surrendering  the  islands  to  Sweden.  The  Finns  on  their 
-side  are  anxious  to  prevent  the  Swedish  boundary  from  approaching 
the  Finnish  mainland. 

The  Esthonians  and  the  Letts 

South  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland  lie  the  Baltic  Provinces,  a broad  strip 
of  coast  land  extending  to  the  frontiers  of  Prussia.  There  are  three 
provinces  in  this  group:  Esthonia,  Livonia,  and  Courland.  Their  com- 
bined area  is  about  36,000  square  miles,  and  they  have  a total  popula- 
tion of  approximately  3,000,000.  There  is  scarcely  any  other  region  in 
Europe  that  offers  more  serious  problems  than  this  strip  of  coast  on  the 
cast  side  of  the  Baltic. 

All  the  great  states  in  the  Baltic  basin  have  at  some  time  or  other 
held  possessions  on  the  eastern  shore.  In  the  thirteenth  century  the 
.^greater  part  of  the  Provinces  was  held  by  the  Danes.  Later  in  the 
same  century  came  the  Teutonic  Knights,  a crusading  order  that  was 
looking  for  a new  field  for  their  military  and  religious  activities.  Dur- 
ing the  sixteenth  and  the  seventeenth  century  the  Swedes  came  into 
possession  of  Esthonia  and  Livonia,  while  Courland  (1561)  was  united 
to  Poland.  Ultimately  the  whole  region  was  annexed  to  Russia.  Ex- 
cepting the  Danes,  whose  occupation  was  for  a brief  period  only,  these 
conquering  peoples  have  left  deep  traces  on  the  history,  the  intellectual 
..life,  and  the  civilization  of  these  three  little  states. 

11 


The  earliest  known  inhabitants  of  this  region  were  the  Letts,  an 
ancient  people  closely  related  to  the  Lithuanian  stock.  The  Letts  and 
the  Lithuanians  must  have  come  into  this  part  of  Europe  long  before 
the  arrival  of  either  the  German  or  the  Slav;  their  language  is  very 
ancient:  it  is  said  that  “almost  any  Lithuanian  peasant  can  understand 
simple  phrases  in  Sanskrit”  (the  language  of  ancient  India). 

Soon  after  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era  the  Finns  entered  the 
country  from  central  Russia.  The  Letts  and  the  Finns  are  still  the 
dominant  races  in  the  Baltic  Provinces.  The  Letts  occupy  the  country 
from  the  Gulf  of  Riga  eastward:  Courland  and  the  southern  half  of 
Livonia.  The  Finns  (Esthonians)  inhabit  the  remainder  of  the  Prov- 
inces: Esthonia  and  the  northern  half  of  Livonia.  There  is  no  longer 
a Livonian  people. 

Scattered  throughout  the  three  Provinces  are  small  groups  of  other 
peoples,  Germans,  Slavs,  Swedes,  Jews  and  mixed  races.  Of  these  the 
German  element  is  the  most  important  and  also  the  most  ancient, 
dating,  as  it  does,  from  the  time  when  the  Teutonic  Knights  controlled 
the  land.  Until  quite  recently  the  German  nobility  was  the  land- 
owning class  in  the  rural  districts;  the  German  merchants  controlled 
the  trade  in  the  cities;  German  scholars  manned  the  institutions  of 
higher  learning;  and  German  clergymen  of  the  Lutheran  faith  directed 
the  affairs  of  the  church  and  the  primary  schools.  The  Germans  com- 
prised only  from  five  to  ten  per  cent  of  the  total  population;  but  their 
importance  in  the  public  life  of  the  Letts  and  the  Esthonians  was  very 
great. 

In  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  Lenine  and  his  associates  were  com- 
pelled to  surrender  the  Baltic  shore-land.  It  is  not  known  just  what 
the  Prussians  intended  to  do  with  the  Provinces,  but  it  is  clear  that 
they  planned  to  organize  them  in  such  a way  as  to  bring  them  into 
some  sort  of  a vassal  relationship  to  the  German  empire.  The  Prussian 
expansionists  realized  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  add  extensive  alien 
elements  to  the  German  citizenship;  but  they  believed  it  possible  to 
annex  the  Baltic  lands  (with  other  neighboring  regions)  to  the  economic 
system  of  the  Fatherland  without  seeming  to  impair  their  national 
rights.  The  extension  of  the  German  strategic  railway  system  from 
the  east  Prussian  border  to  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  perhaps  even  to  some 
port  on  the  Arctic,  and  the  admission  of  the  Baltic  states  to  the  project- 
ed Mid-European  tariff  union  would  give  the  commercial  interests  of 
Germany  an  unassailable  position  on  the  east  coast  of  the  Baltic  Sea. 

Economic  dependence  naturally  carries  with  it  a certain  measure  of 

12 


political  vassalage.  Military  alliances  and  the  election  of  German 
princes  to  Baltic  thrones  were  also  important  items  in  the  Pan-German 
program.  During  the  summer  of  1918  several  princelings  from  the 
lesser  German  states  held  themselves  in  readiness  to  accept  crowns  or 
coronets  in  the  conquered  lands.  It  was  reported  at  one  time  that  the 
Kaiser  thought  seriously  of  assuming  the  title  duke  of  Courland. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  recent  armistice  it  was  stipulated  that  the 
Germans  should  withdraw  the  forces  that  were  still  being  kept  in  regions 
formerly  belonging  to  Russia.  When  this  became  known  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  Provinces  began  to  look  forward  to  national  independence. 
There  was  already  a working  governmental  organization  among  the 
Esthonians,  and  late  in  November  the  Letts  proclaimed  a republic  in 
Riga  to  be  known  as  Lettland.  It  was  announced  that  it  was  to  be  a 
state  primarily  for  native  Letts  and  that  no  German  Balts  were  to  be 
admitted  to  office  in  the  ministry.  At  the  same  time  one  Karl  Kull- 
mann  (or  Ullmann)  was  appointed  prime  minister;  if  his  name  is  an 
indication,  the  new  regent  of  Lettland  is  surely  not  innocent  of  Teuton- 
ic ancestry. 

When  the  German  forces  began  to  retire,  the  Letts  and  the  Esthon- 
ians suddenly  found  themselves  facing  a new  danger  from  the  east. 
On  the  heels  of  the  retreating- Teutons  came  the  hosts  of  the  Bolsheviki, 
who  had  seized  the  opportunity  to  begin  a vigorous  campaign  of  recon- 
quest. In  the  neighborhood  of  Narva  the  Red  army  met  a decisive 
defeat,  however,  and  the  invasion  seems,  at  this  writing,  to  have  been 
checked,  though  perhaps  only  temporarily.  The  Finns  apparently 
came  to  the  assistance  of  their  Esthonian  kinsmen  and  the  Swedes  ap- 
pear to  have  shown  some  interest  in  the  cause  of  the  Letts.  But  the 
situation  remains  very  precarious:  the  Russian  forces  are  evidently 
undisciplined  and  inefficient;  but  they  are  strong  in  numbers  and  it  is 
doubtful  whether  the  Baltic  levies  can  defeat  another  offensive. 

The  future  of  this  region  is  therefore  extremely  uncertain.  There 
are  no  indications  as  to  how  the  controlling  minds  at  the  peace  con- 
ference regard  the  problems  of  the  old  Russian  frontier;  consequently, 
all  that  can  be  done  at  present  is  to  indicate  a few  of  the  more  probable 
solutions. 

(1)  The  Provinces  may  be  restored  to  Russia.  There  seems  to  be 
a Bolshevik  element  in  the  Baltic  lands  which  naturally  favors  some  sort 
of  a reunion  with  the  great  neighbor  to  the  east.  In  the  earlier  days  of 
the  Lenine  regime,  the  “people’s  commissioners”  depended  largely  on 
the  military  services  of  the  “Lettish  guard,”  a force  of  Lettish  soldiers 

13 


with  strong  revolutionary  tendencies.  But  this  element  is  probably! 
not  a numerous  one,  as  the  population  of  the  Provinces  is  chiefly  agri- 
cultural, and  the  problem  of  the  land  has  been  to  some  extent  solved  by 
the  extension  of  a system  of  peasant  proprietorship. 


There  is,  indeed,  something  to  be  said  for  reunion  with  Russia.  The 
war  has  left  Russia  in  great  need  of  commercial  outlets.  The  best 
ports  on  the  Black  Sea  have  been  seized  by  the  Ukrainians;  and  in  the 
Baltic  region  a single  port  remains:  Petrograd,  which  is  ice-bound  for 
several  months  of  the  year.  Practically  the  only  ice-free  port  remain- 
ing within  the  borders  of  Russia  is  Catherine  Harbor  on  the  Arctic 
coast.  The  Bolshevik  mind  may  be  deficient  in  patriotism  but  it  no 
doubt  understands  the  importance  of  commercial  outlets  and  the 
economic  value  of  ice-free  ports.  In  the  Baltic  Provinces  there  are  at  least 
six  fair  harbors,  all  of  which  have  a longer  period  of  navigation  than 
Petrograd.  Of  these  the  best  known  is  Riga,  though  it  is  less  important 
than  Libau,  which  is  open  for  navigation  every  month  in  the  year. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  Russia  needs  the  Baltic  ports,  but  it  is  also 
clear  that  these  ports  are  in  real  need  of  Russia.  Their  prosperity  has 
in  large  measure  been  built  up  on  the  commerce  of  the  vast  plain  to 
the  east  and  if  means  should  be  found  to  divert  this  trade  to  another 
series  of  ports,  there  would  be  economic  distress  along  the  whole  shore 
from  Libau  to  Narva. 


(2*)  They  may  be  allowed  to  torganize  themselves  into  two  inde- 
pendent states  (as  appears  to  be  their  desire),  in  which  case  the  common 
boundary  would  probably  be  the  Salis  River,  a small  stream  that  ap- 
proximately separates  the  Esthonian  settlements  from  those  of  the 
Letts.  It  is  a grave  question  whether  these  two  peoples  have  sufficient 
strength  and  resources  to  maintain  a self-respecting  existence.  At  the 
highest  the  population  of  the  proposed  Lettland  will  not  exceed  2,000,- 
000,  while  that  of  Esthonia  will  be  less  than  1,000,000.  It  would 
seem  that  such  an  arrangement  must  mean  serious  difficulties  in  the 
future. 

(3)  Esthonia  may  decide  to  join  Finland.  Recent  years  have  seen 
the  development  of  a strong  national  feeling  among  the  Esthonians,  but 
being,  after  all,  a branch  of  the  Finnish  race,  they  ought  to  be  able  to 
live  in  reasonable  happiness  with  their  brothers  in  a greater  Finland. 
If  the  Finns  are  permitted  to  annex  Karelia  to  the  east  and  Esthonia 
to  the  south,  their  country  will  have  a population  of  approximately 
5,000,000. 


14 


(4)  The  Letts  may  be  asked  to  join  forces  with  their  Lithuanian 
kinsmen  in  a revived  Lithuanian  state.  Six  hundred  years  ago  Lithua- 
nia had  a period  of  greatness,  her  area  covering  an  extensive  region  east 
of  Poland  between  the  Baltic  and  the  Black  Sea.  Since  then  a consid- 
erable part  of  the  Lithuanian  race  has  been  absorbed  into  the  Slavic 
mass;  there  have  also  been  strong  currents  of  emigration  from  the 
Lithuanian  territories  to  Siberia  and  to  other  parts  of  Russia  and  even 
to  lands  across  the  Atlantic.  At  present  the  Lithuanian  popula- 
tion in  its  native  territories  numbers  less  than  3,500,000. 

The  Lithuanian  area  is  not  extensive,  perhaps  not  more  than  30,000 
square  miles.  The  future  of  this  region  has  not  been  much  discussed; 
the  organization  of  a Lithuanian  state  has  been  urged  and  is  within  the 
realm  of  the  possible;  but  it  is  not  a promising  solution,  especially  if 
the  Letts  should  insist  on  establishing  a separate  state. 

For  several  centuries  the  Lithuanians  and  in  part  also  the  Letts 
were  subjects  of  the  king  of  Poland.  It  is  possible  that  they  might  be 
induced  to  renew  this  historic  relationship,  though  it  is  doubtful,  since 
racially  Poles  and  Lithuanians  have  nothing  in  common.  They  will, 
however,  have  common  rivals  and  perhaps  enemies  to  the  east  and  the 
west,  and  such  a union  may  in  time  be  forced  by  circumstances,  as  it 
was  forced  in  the  middle  ages.  An  arrangement  of  this  sort  would  add 
considerably  to  the  strength  of  Poland,  and,  what  is  more  important, 
it  would  give  the  Poles  a satisfactory  commercial  outlet  on  the  Baltic. 

Danzig 

As  a result  of  the  Great  War  and  the  consequent  readjustment  of 
frontiers,  several  important  European  states  are  likely  to  find  them- 
selves deprived  of  direct  access  to  the  sea.  These  are  German  Austria, 
Hungary,  Bohemia  (the  republic  of  the  Czechs  and  Slovaks),  and 
Poland.  In  the  case  of  German  Austria  this  condition  may  be  reme- 
died by  the  admission  of  the  Austrian  territories  to  the  new  German 
republic;  but  for  Bohemia  and  Hungary  the  only  solution  of  this  diffi- 
culty appears  to  be  an  economic  arrangement  with  some  neighboring 
state. 

It  is  possible,  as  suggested  above,  that  Poland  may  be  able  to  reach 
the  sea  through  the  lands  of  the  Letts  and  the  Lithuanians.  The  Poles 
hope,  however,  to  secure  a shorter  and  more  direct  route  by  way  of  the 
Vistula.  Libau  and  Riga  are,  indeed,  desirable  ports;  but  from  the  Polish 
viewpoint  Danzig  at  the  mouth  of  the  Vistula  is  the  natural  outlet. 

The  Poles  insist  that  the  Vistula  is  a Polish  river  and  should  therefore 

, 15 


be  under  their  control  throughout  its  entire  course.  It  is  true  that 
both  banks  of  this  river  have  a Polish  population  to  a point  some  dis- 
tance below  Thorn  or  about  one  hundred  miles  from  its  mouth.  Along 
the  lower  course  between  Thorn  and  the  Baltic,  the  Polish  population 
occupies  a narrow  tongue  of  land  from  twenty  to  fifty  miles  wide  lying 
along  the  west  bank  of  the  river,  while  the  opposite  bank  is  occupied 
a’most  exclusively  by  Germans.  The  Poles  insist  that  this  strip  of 
territory  is  not  only  essentially  Polish,  but  is  also  necessary  to  their 
economic  life  and  to  the  successful  defense  of  their  country;  they  de- 
mand, therefore,  that  it  be  included  in  the  revived  Polish  state. 

This  area  was  for  several  centuries  a part  of  the  Polish  kingdom  but 
was  taken  by  the  Prussians  in  the  partitions  of  Poland  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  To  return  what  territory  is  still  Polish  in  speech  and  senti- 
ment, seems,  therefore,  a matter  of  justice  merely.  There  are,  however, 
certain  facts  and  conditions  that  must  be  taken  seriously  into  account 
before  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  is  definitely  handed  over  to  the 
Polish  state. 

(1)  The  tongue  of  land  in  question  lies  wholly  within  the  territory 
of  Prussia;  if  it  is  annexed  to  Poland  that  part  of  Germany  east  of  the 
Vistula  will  be  separated  completely  from  the  rest  of  the  Fatherlai^b 
It  is  inconceivable  that  the  Germans  will  remain  satisfied  with  this 
condition.  The  Poles  are  consequently  likely  to  find  that  the  pos- 
session of  this  strip  is  a danger  as  well  as  an  advantage.  In  case  of 
war  with  Germany  it  could  not  be  successfully  defended.' 

(2)  The  territory,  while  largely  Polish  in  population,  is  not  exclu- 
sively so;  it  has  a strong  German  minority  which  in  certain  sections  is 
almost  as  strong  as  the  Slavic  majority.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the 
cities  where  the  Germans  are,  in  places,  even  the  more  numerous  element. 

(3)  The  region  would  lose  much  of  its  economic  value  to  Poland 
unless  Danzig  were  included.  But  Danzig  is  essentially  a German 
city,  nine-tenths  of  the  population  being  German  in  race  and  speech.* 
Through  most  of  its  history  Danzig  has  been  German  rather  than 
Polish;  though  for  a long  time  it  was  counted  as  a part  of  the  Polish 
kingdom,  its  relationship  to  that  state  was  almost  wholly  nominal,  as 
it  enjoyed  privileges  which  made  it  practically  a self-governing  republic. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  prosperity  of  Dan- 
zig is  based  largely  on  the  great  trade  that  flows  toward  it  from  the 
valley  of  the  Vistula.  And  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  disposal 
of  the  tongue  of  land  between  Thorn  and  Danzig  involves  the  political 
fate  of  more  than  500,000  Poles. 


16 


